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[ti]Laughing when you shouldn’t: 
Being “good” among the Batek of Peninsular Malaysia 
[ab]Batek people describe their many laughter taboos with utmost 
seriousness, and in ethical terms of good and bad. Despite this, people often 
get it wrong—sometimes laughing all the more when the taboos forbid it. 
Because laughter can be ambiguous and impossible to control, being wrong 
can be accepted without the need for discussion or reflection. People thus 
act autonomously while holding deeply shared ethical orientations. Here, 
ethics can be both culturally predefined and shaped by individuals, as when 
it comes to laughter people draw on individual and shared concerns in an ad 
hoc, flexible manner. Laughter’s tangled contradictions thus demonstrate 
that people’s understandings of being “good” are mutually implicated with 
their understandings of what it means to be a person in relation to others. 
[laughter, egalitarianism, taboo, ethics, hunter-gatherers, Batek, Malaysia, 
Southeast Asia] 
[ab]Kaum Batek begitu serius apabila menerangkan tentang kebanyakan 
pantang larang mereka mengenai ketawa, dan buruk baiknya dari segi etika. 
Walau bagaimanapun, ramai orang masih keliru—kadang-kadang mereka 
lebih banyak ketawa padahal ini dilarang menurut pantang larang. Oleh 
kerana ketawa adalah sesuatu yang mempunyai banyak makna dan sukar 
ditafsirkan dan tidak mungkin dikawal, ‘kesalahan’ ini boleh diterima tanpa 
perlu dibincangkan atau dipertimbangkan. Oleh kerana itu, orang bertindak 
bersendirian pada masa yang sama memegang nilai etika yang dikongsi 
bersama. Di sini, etika boleh ditakrifkan terlebih dahulu menurut budaya 
ataupun dibentuk oleh individu, kerana dengan ketawa, orang 
memahaminya dari kepentingan individu atau bersama mengikut keadaan 
tertentu dan cara yang fleksibel. Percanggahan dalam erti ketawa 
menunjukkan pemahaman seseorang itu untuk menjadi baik saling 
menunjukkan pemahaman mereka mengenai apa ertinya seseorang itu 
dalam hubungan dengan orang lain. [ketawa, egalitarianisme, pantang 
larang, etika, pemburu-pemungut, Batek, Malaysia, Asia Tenggara] 
[dc]Naʔ Srimjam and I once stayed up late drinking tea while everyone else 
was asleep.1 As we chatted, a frog started to croak. This particular frog’s call 
sounds uncannily like someone breaking wind, and the sound therefore 
caused us to break into uncontrollable, foolish laughter. But it is taboo to 
laugh at this type of frog because it is a lawac animal, part of a set of taboos 
that includes among its consequences the risk of angering the thunder being 
Gubar, meaning that laughing at it could cause a storm. Every time we 
laughed, she would therefore anxiously hush and chide that we risked being 
lawac. As she did so, she would just about get her laughter under control, 
straighten her face, and then burst into peals of laughter once more as soon 
as the frog called again. This went on countless times until she was weeping 
weakly in hilarity. In the morning, she recounted this story to her mother 
and sisters, who also responded by chuckling. 
For Batek people, laughter is pleasurable yet subject to taboo, and in 
the wrong situations it can have catastrophic consequences. Given the 
potential danger of laughter, people often talk about knowing when and how 
to laugh as an important indicator of a person’s ability to act ethically, or in 
their words, to act in a btʔɛt (Batek: good, right, beautiful) way rather than 
in a jbec (Batek: bad, wrong, ugly) one.2 As Naʔ Srimjam showed, however, 
knowing that it is taboo to laugh doesn’t always mean the laughter stops, 
since knowing that the laughter is forbidden can make something even 
funnier—and the laughter impossible to control. While taking the taboos and 
their consequences extremely seriously, and having a deeply shared, 
explicitly articulated, understanding of what is btʔɛt and jbec, people may 
also decide to ignore the taboos, they may make mistakes, or they may 
spontaneously throw caution to the wind. 
Laughter itself is thus inherently conflicting: it can be at once 
dangerous, tabooed, subversive, permitted, joyful, pleasurable, and 
impossible to control. How, therefore, might managing the conflicting 
demands of laughter shape people’s broader ideas of the “good”? What 
might this tell one about the nature of ethical beliefs themselves? Because 
laughter can be uncontrollable, and because people can thus easily get it 
wrong, it is an ideal vehicle with which to explore how people shape their 
everyday ethical dilemmas into a shared orientation toward what it means to 
be a “good” person. 
The Batek are one of at least 19 ethnolinguistic groups of Orang Asli 
(Malay: Original People) of Peninsular Malaysia and Thailand (Endicott 2016, 
1).3 The most recent estimate puts their population at over 1,500 across the 
Malaysian states of Pahang, Terengganu, and Kelantan (Endicott 2016 et al., 
100). They are lowland rain forest dwellers who move between living 
locations in and around Taman Negara (Malay: National Park). They center 
their daily activities around hunting and gathering, trade, day laboring 
(inside the forest and on palm oil plantations), and tourism work. Among 
themselves they speak Batek, a language of the Northern Aslian branch of 
the Austroasiatic family, and most also speak Malay fluently, though there is 
a slight tendency that some younger men may be more fluent than some 
older women.4 
Batek people have many forms of interaction with Malaysians and 
foreigners, or “outsiders,” to whom they refer using the blanket term gɔp. 
They use this term to refer to all non-Batek outsiders (perhaps specified as 
“white gɔp,” “Christian gɔp,” or “Chinese gɔp”), but it is also used specifically 
to identify Malays (“real gɔp”) from other non-Batek people and to invoke 
Islam. They describe Batek who convert to Islam as “becoming gɔp.” 
Interactions with gɔp often result from participation in trade and 
tourism (Endicott 2016 et al.). Consequently, some Batek people spend a lot 
of time around gɔp, others don’t. But even for those who choose not to 
regularly interact with gɔp, gɔp’s presence is all around in Batek homes.5 
This could be in the form of Malay foodstuffs, the sounds of Malay and 
Indonesian pop music played on mobile phones, the use of Malay loanwords, 
or even the prevalent diseases that people associate as originating with gɔp, 
such as tuberculosis. In some Batek areas, the sound of the call to prayer 
can be heard drifting over the treetops. 
Despite this, Batek people also regularly use ethical terms to contrast 
the behavior of gɔp with their own behavior (Lye 2005, 67-68), as is the 
case in other ethnographic contexts (Basso 1984; Kricheff and Lukas 2015). 
Even Malay loanwords are pronounced in distinctively Batek ways, and 
people were keen to correct me if I accidentally used the gɔp ways of 
pronouncing them when speaking Batek. People distinguish forest foods 
from gɔp foods, and forest medicines from gɔp medicines. Indeed, there are 
often taboos that prohibit the mixing of substances that originate in what are 
kept as two separate realms. These apply even when Batek people live (as 
many now do) on the forest fringes, among palm oil and rubber plantations. 
Ways of laughing are no exception to this sought-after ethical separation 
between Batek and gɔp. The separation is both clearly demarcated (Dentan 
1975; Kricheff and Lukas 2015) and ambiguous, given that people at once 
enjoy and denounce many gɔp things.6 
Though Batek people do not articulate an abstract category of “ethics,” 
attention to the ethical pervades everyday discourses and actions (Endicott 
and Endicott 2008, 43), framed in terms of what is btʔɛt and its opposite, 
jbec. These terms are used in everyday situations to refer to things that, to 
Batek people, deserve them. Judgments of btʔɛt may apply to the smell of 
certain flowers, the taste of fruits or other delicious foods, the sensation of 
cool, clear water on the skin, the sight of vines hanging down from an old 
tree into the river, a person who shares a lot, a rain-tight home, a tightly 
woven sleeping mat, properly tidied-away things (such as hair decorations), 
doing something right so as to adhere to the taboos, the sound of certain 
cicadas, and walking carefully in the forest by avoiding tripping or getting 
caught on thorns (unlike gɔp, who they say don’t know how to walk properly 
in the forest). Jbec may apply to bad smells, sounds, or tastes, things done 
halfheartedly or wrongly, or a “bad” or “mad” person. These are all styles of 
behaving that the Batek regularly and explicitly describe as being not only 
btʔɛt but also “Batek.” 
Furthermore, men who worked as tour guides told of tourists laughing 
around leeches and insects on night hikes, or generally being too noisy in 
the forest and hence causing storms. These, like Naʔ Srimjam’s laughter at 
the frog, are lawac actions. Practices surrounding laughter are part of this 
broader range of behavioral and communicative subtleties that are seen as 
distinctively Batek. Particular ways of laughing are therefore signs of an 
ethical, btʔɛt, and Batek person, signs that can be seen as a kind of 
communicative “key” (Hymes 1974, 57–58). Batek people use the “key” 
implied by certain ways of laughing to indicate how “good” a person is, 
which is often contrasted to the immoral or ignorant behavior of outsiders. 
Batek people might also contrast gɔp with themselves in other ways: 
they often talk about how gɔp “don’t share” their food, belongings, and 
money, and about how they prefer to move camps often, so that gɔp can’t 
tell them what to do. Batek people thus ground both their ethnicity and their 
ethical orientations toward egalitarianism in their everyday practices 
(Endicott and Endicott 2008).7. When outsiders’ behavior demonstrates an 
ethical orientation that opposes Batek values, it can further reinforce these 
distinctions, both in terms of how people laugh and of who is said to behave 
in the “right” (btʔɛt) way. 
As was demonstrated when Naʔ Srimjam laughed at the frog, 
however, behaving in the “right” and “Batek” way does not necessarily mean 
always adhering to the taboos. Indeed, on that occasion, no aspersions were 
cast on her “Batekness,” despite her lawac action. She was not considered to 
have become gɔp, nor were her actions considered jbec. How, then, does a 
group of people negotiate these taboos with the kind of autonomy that Naʔ 
Srimjam demonstrated, without feeling as though they are undermining a 
shared, preexisting ethical system that is distinctly “Batek”? 
When people laugh when they shouldn’t, the picture that emerges of 
how they seek “to create the good in their lives” (Robbins 2013, 457) calls 
into question the artificial assumption of ethics as either an imposed set of 
social obligations followed by unthinking individuals (Laidlaw 2014), or as 
something shaped by individuals in a process of reflective self-fashioning 
(Scheele 2015, 35; see also Keane 2016, 20, for a summary of this debate). 
Instead, ethics are best considered kinds of “orientations” that are formed 
through an ad hoc patchwork of motivations and justifications. These 
orientations move continually between individual and shared concerns, and 
they are implicated in and shaped by how people conceive of themselves in 
relation to others. 
[h1]Ethical orientations as lived experience 
[ni]As Naʔ Srimjam demonstrated that night with the frog, people 
sometimes do laugh when, according to the taboos, they shouldn’t, and in 
some instances they are not viewed as behaving unethically for doing so. Yet 
this doesn’t mean that people don’t take the taboos seriously: it would be 
reductive to downplay the importance and centrality of these taboos, which 
are a highly salient set of beliefs and values that existed long before the 
individuals with whom I conducted fieldwork. Ethical concepts, therefore, 
cannot be seen only as mechanisms of social control (Laidlaw 2014, 16–17), 
since people like Naʔ Srimjam sometimes seem quite ready to act outside 
the behaviors that ideas of right and wrong recommend. At the same time, 
people’s broader cultural imaginings can’t be relegated to the background 
(Scheele 2015, 35). Indeed, though she acted with ethical autonomy in 
breaking the taboo, in that instance what made Naʔ Srimjam’s tabooed 
laughter so enjoyable were her own cultural imaginings (alongside the fact 
that the sound of the frog was funny in itself!). “Categories” can thus 
“precede actors,” and when one considers ethics, one cannot dismiss local 
imaginings of collectives in favor of a sole focus on the individual, and vice 
versa (Scheele 2015, 35). 
This tension between individual autonomy and shared cultural 
imaginings is reflected in debates on the nature of ethics itself. I use the 
term ethics over morality, because these terms are largely interchangeable 
(Fassin 2012, 6; Laidlaw 2014, 4; Lambek 2010a; Mattingly 2014, 474; 
Mattingly and Throop 2018). The two terms have, however, sometimes been 
mobilized for different purposes, reflecting one of the major debates in the 
area: Do morals, as types of rules, determine what people are obligated to 
do (Durkheim 1953, 59–60)? Or are ethics subjective, produced by “agents” 
in “accordance with their inquiry about what a good life is” (Fassin 2012, 6–
8)?8 
This strong difference in positions sets out an unhelpful dichotomy, 
which can be expressed as the following question: Do we have the freedom 
to define what we think of as good and to act accordingly, or are our ideas of 
the good imposed on us by cultural obligations, which in turn define how we 
act? Among the Batek, this amounts to the question: Do people have the 
freedom to define their own ideas of the “good,” or are their ethical 
orientations imposed on them by the taboo complexes (adherence to which 
is considered ethical)? More specifically with regard to laughter, do people 
decide for themselves when and how to laugh, or do they laugh only in 
accordance with the ideals the taboos lay out? 
When people laugh when they shouldn’t, it demonstrates the 
artificiality of such a dichotomy (Keane 2016, 20). These moments 
demonstrate that people shape their ethical orientations in the constant 
motion between individual and collective concerns at any given moment. 
Though debates surrounding freedom in the shaping of ethics are thus as 
messy as human ethical puzzles themselves, how people handle the 
messiness of their lived experiences—in particular their unpredictable, 
contagious laughter—is key to how they form shared ethical orientations. 
These are based not on social control but on a shifting, flexible 
understanding of what it means to be a person in relation to others. 
Some (though not all) Batek people can move seamlessly between 
interacting with gɔp in Malay, perhaps using their mannerisms and 
references, and moments later denouncing these behaviors as “unethical,” 
or jbec. Almost all people carefully modify their actions most of the time so 
as to take into account the preferences of Gubar and the nonhuman persons, 
such as fruits and flowers, considering these varied persons as others in 
relation to them (Rudge 2017, forthcoming; see also Lye 2005, 117–19). 
Personhood is made through relatedness—every person being made up of 
the relations they build with others (Bird-David 1999). Persons are “social 
microcosms,” containing a plurality within themselves (Strathern 1990, 13). 
Movement between persons and collectives constitutes social life 
(Strathern 1990, 14; cf. Jackson 2017, xvi), which is thus an “ad hoc 
plurality” (Bird-David 2005, 214) of related individuals, a diverse “many” 
who work “separately together” (Bird-David 2017, 14–15, 129). People’s 
concerns over what constitutes being ethically “Batek” does not imply that 
they seek an “undifferentiated unity of consciousness” (Stasch 2009, 1; on 
“Western” perceptions of Korowai, see Bird-David 2017, 17; Stasch 2009), 
or that they undergo “de-pluralization” (Strathern 1990, 13) in their shared 
understanding of themselves as Batek. When they consider “Batekness,” the 
ways people laugh (and try not to) demonstrate that people are quite 
concerned with how to allow for individuality within the ways that they seek 
to cooperate, as related yet separate persons, in shared ethical projects. 
Among the Batek of Kelantan State, this dynamic has been referred to as 
“cooperative autonomy” (Endicott 2011, 2008). 
It is necessary, therefore, to understand people as constantly moving 
between an ad hoc patchwork of motivations and justifications in their 
everyday ethical lives (Briggs 1998, 2). Reflecting this, I use the term ethical 
orientation, because ethics might risk implying that ethical behavior is fixed. 
Batek people orient themselves toward what they see as btʔɛt, using 
whichever is appropriate in that moment—perhaps acting in a way that is 
defined as btʔɛt—and perhaps making mistakes, acting spontaneously, or 
ignoring these ideals completely. 
[h1]Dangerous laughter and its consequences 
[ni]Reflecting this, the Batek’s taboos, while largely consistent, may also 
seem idiosyncratic. There may be slight variations between people, between 
extended networks of families and friends, or between areas of the forest 
(Endicott 1979, 30). From reading earlier ethnographies of other Semang 
groups (Schebesta 1928; Skeat and Blagden 1906; Needham 1967), one 
can get the sense that the taboos, including those on laughter, are 
conceived of as strict “rules.” These rules are analyzed for their symbolic 
properties, with little attention to the lived experiences of the people who 
practice them. 
One might thus get the sense that taboos are only fear-causing rules 
or obligations (Tacey 2013, 246–47), as if “moral facts” constituted “moral 
authority,” which individuals are in “no position to question” (Durkheim 
1953, 56–60; see also Howell 1981, 2012). Pushing to make the taboos 
seem systematic and structural, scholars have exaggerated the extent to 
which they are rule bound, and overlooked part of the role they play in 
Batek ethical life. This is not to say there isn’t some systematicity: while 
allowing for a level of idiosyncrasy, the broad shape of Batek taboos and 
cosmological beliefs have indeed remained similar in overall shape across 
generations and locations (Endicott 1979) while adapting to relevant local 
and global events (Lye 2005; Tacey 2013). In the case of the laughter 
taboos, however, they are not always applied as strictly as might be 
inferred. 
This goes for the specific case of the laughter taboos. One person 
might give one answer on one day regarding a particular detail of the 
taboos, and in a new encounter have a slightly different opinion or piece of 
information. During fieldwork, if I was to ask people why someone had said 
something different from what they had told me, or why they had told me 
something different before, the answer would often be “It just is” (blap blap 
leh), or “I don’t know, him or her on their own” (ʔacoh ʔoʔ blaʔ). The answer 
would almost always apply when asking about why sometimes consequences 
for taboo laughter were suffered and sometimes nothing seemed to happen, 
even when someone had done something wrong—“it just is.” 
Despite this level of idiosyncrasy, there are some fundamental tenets 
that individuals and groups do consistently describe, in ways that resemble 
how early anthropologists described taboos among other Semang groups 
(Schebesta 1928; Skeat and Blagden 1906), and that are widely present in 
the region even beyond other Orang Asli groups (Benjamin 2013, 454). 
Neither these idiosyncrasies nor consistencies should be ignored. It is 
precisely this conflict that makes evident how people seek to simultaneously 
foreground separateness and togetherness in how they orient themselves 
toward an idea of “the good.” 
All laughter is potentially taboo if it is loud or goes on for too long, 
because it is lawac and risks causing a storm. Some laughter is particularly 
tabooed. Thus, all laughter is taboo, but some instances of it are more taboo 
than others. The main consequence of the taboos termed lawac is the risk of 
upsetting Gubar, who is sensitive to laughter at certain things, laughter that 
is too raucous, particular kinds of mockery, loud sounds, and the mixing of 
incompatible smells or bodies. In response, he gets angry and stomps 
around, causing a storm. In the forest, people fear storms greatly, since 
strong winds can cause trees to fall, which can be fatal. Things that are 
lawac to laugh at include certain lawac animals, such as the clouded monitor 
lizard and white-handed gibbon. Particular invertebrates are also considered 
extremely lawac, the primary example being the leech, which is often simply 
referred to as “the bad one.” Indeed, a common explanation for storms 
would be along the lines of “Perhaps we were close to leeches when we 
laughed in the forest earlier.” 
It is also taboo to laugh at or mock things for other reasons. For 
example, to laugh at things such as fruits, flowers, bees, or honey, which 
are considered tahun (Batek: “of the fruit season,” from the Malay word for 
“year”; Lye 2005, 60), is widely said to risk madness (Rudge 2017, 162). 
The extreme symptoms of this might be a head that swells to gigantic 
proportions, trying to eat fire, caterpillars coming out of one’s eyes, and 
being unable to speak, such that “even your parents wouldn’t recognize 
you,” as one older Batek woman warned me in regard to a particular kind of 
fruit. By extension, singing shaman songs, which have an important 
relationship to the fruit season (Endicott 1979, 55–61), also risks madness if 
one doesn’t sing properly and beautifully, or if one jokes about them or 
laughs a lot while singing them. 
These ideals are reflected in other practices surrounding fruits, 
flowers, and honey, such as not stepping over them, not leaving them lying 
around on the floor, and not throwing them about. As well as risking danger 
to the laughers, uproarious behavior around fruits, flowers, or honey may 
also risk making them feel shy, ashamed, or embarrassed (yũp), and 
therefore cause them not to appear, bloom, or ripen that year, as might 
defecating or talking about defecating close to fruit trees. Laughing a lot at 
another person (unless that person was deemed “mad”) would also be 
thought of as jbec behavior, for the same reason that it would make that 
person shy, embarrassed, or ashamed. Laughing at anything that you are 
eating is also dangerous, especially animals, since it can cause diarrhea or 
stomach cramps. This is exemplified by a story from the “old times,” in 
which two shamans went hunting and caught a bear, and as they were 
cooking it, they mocked the bear’s hands, laughing and saying it looked “just 
like a human hand.” The shamans were then afflicted with so much diarrhea 
that they died. 
[h1]Learning to laugh 
[ni]These taboos surrounding laughter can be understood as ways of 
“marking” (Valeri 2000, 46) particular things or ways of behaving that are 
considered btʔɛt. In this case, “good” behaviors concern respecting forest 
foods, especially fruits and flowers, and therefore respecting, by not 
laughing at, the nonhuman persons with whom the Batek share the forest. 
At the same time, the taboos mark out those things or behaviors that are 
jbec by outlining potential danger. Learning to control one’s laughter and 
mockery in relation to what shouldn’t be mocked is thus a kind of ethical 
skill, whereby one learns how to live in a “good” way that foregrounds the 
relatedness of Batek people and the nonhuman persons of the forest. 
If this were the end of the story, however, there would be little room 
for flexibility, disagreement, or getting things wrong. Instead, while allowing 
for some difference in how individuals treat the taboos in general, the 
laughter taboos tend to be the most commonly and obviously broken, even 
though all kinds of taboos may occasionally be either accidentally broken or 
surreptitiously ignored. Because it is laughter that is the subject of taboo in 
this case, the autonomy of individual persons is built into the very idea of 
cooperating in the shared ethical project of “Batekness.” This is for two 
reasons. First, laughter can happen at any time, no matter what people are 
doing. It is not restricted to any one domain of activity, and people’s control 
of their laughter is obvious to everyone nearby. Almost any situation can 
therefore become one in which people learn a shared understanding of the 
“right” and “good” ways to control their laughter. 
Second, given that laughter is ever present, children learn how they 
are supposed to laugh by copying their elders’ and peers’ behavior, through 
imitation and curiosity, in what is termed a “learner-motivated pedagogic 
practice” in relation to taboos among Mbendjele hunter-gatherers in Congo-
Brazzaville (Lewis 2008, 297). Laughter taboos thus provide a means of 
people’s ethical enskillment through everyday practices. This is a manner of 
“teaching” values that does not require deference to a single authority figure 
or to a single set of rules (Lewis 2008, 305). Knowledge of the taboos is 
diffuse.9 Though everyone is familiar with them, some people may have 
particular personal knowledge. They may have laughed when eating a 
certain food and fallen sick, or perhaps they laughed in a particular situation 
that ended up having other dangerous or unpleasant ramifications.
I was also taught the taboos by Batek people in this kind of ad hoc 
manner, reminiscent of how children learn the taboos: for example, when 
about to go looking for freshwater mussels, I was warned, “Don’t laugh 
around them. They are lawac.” Similarly, when I first ate monitor lizard, I 
was reminded not to bathe in the river to avoid the taboo of mixing its blood 
with the river, and when I first had my hair decorated with cosmologically 
important fragrant leaves and flowers, I was warned not to say their names 
too much or to leave them lying around carelessly. When I got things wrong, 
anyone around would tell me immediately, even children. 
Knowledge of the taboos, or responsibility for teaching them is thus 
not held by any one particular person or group of people. As with 
cosmological knowledge more broadly, knowledge of the taboos is described 
in “bits and pieces, which is also the form in which they learn about it” 
(Endicott 1979, 30). The laughter taboos are thus a form of pedagogy that is 
a distinctively egalitarian version of Michel Foucault’s (2000, 287) argument 
that ethical “care of the self” requires “listening to the lessons of a master.” 
Because of how the taboos are learned and shared, there is here no 
discernible “master.” 
Batek people thus ensure that not only do people learn through the 
content of the taboos, or what one can and can’t laugh at, but they also 
learn from the process itself. Learning how to learn, how to participate in 
these complex taboos autonomously and without enforcing one’s authority 
on others, is itself a process of ethical enskillment embedded in daily 
activities. 
Just as knowledge of the taboos is dispersed, the consequences of 
violating them are not enforced by any one person. Although the 
consequences of breaking a lawac taboo may have a negative impact on 
everyone, the responsibility for arbitrating the taboos is outside the human 
realm, since it is Gubar who reacts to the wrongdoing. In the case of the 
lawac taboos, the potential for direct criticism by other Batek people for 
having “caused” Gubar to be upset by breaking the lawac taboos is further 
removed, because it is often difficult to know who upset Gubar. It may have 
been someone in another camp, it may have even been a Malay person or 
outsider, or it may have been something that happened a few days before. 
Sometimes, people do lawac things and get away with it, and other times 
there has been no lawac action, and yet there is a storm. 
Though people may sometimes have their suspicions and articulate 
them (usually by gossiping), it would be extremely rare to directly accuse 
someone of having caused a storm to their face, and unheard of that 
someone would attempt to mete out anything resembling punishment 
(Endicott and Endicott 2008, 43). Sometimes, people say, things “just 
happen,” and only “them on their own” know why. 
[h1]Getting it wrong: Uncontrollable laughter 
[ni]Laughter can be counterintuitive, as Naʔ Srimjam made evident when 
she laughed at the frog all the more because she knew she shouldn’t. 
Though she was aware of the danger of laughing at the frog—she just 
couldn’t help herself. Laughter can thus be uncontrollable, compulsive, and 
highly contagious. It may sometimes be voluntary, but it also sometimes 
erupts spontaneously. If sometimes one can’t control one’s own laughter, 
even when this belies one’s better ethical judgments, how might this very 
contradiction shape ideas of right and wrong? It is the multifaceted, 
unpredictable aspects of laughter that mean it can be used in the shaping of 
people’s ethical orientations. 
Naʔ Srimjam demonstrated this on a further occasion. Her sons had 
come back with a monitor lizard that afternoon. Many people in the camp 
wouldn’t eat it because it had come from the palm oil plantation rather than 
the forest—prompting people to say that it was disgusting, since it had 
probably lived on the feces of rats and pigs. Naʔ Srimjam was hungry, 
however, and so was her mother. I sat with her while she scraped off the 
scales, butchered it, carefully laid out the portions on a banana leaf, and 
skewered the liver on a stick to smoke over the fire. As we sat, her sister, 
Naʔ Badək called from the bottom of the camp to warn her that gɔp had 
arrived. 
The gɔp in question in this example was a famously “bad” Malay 
person, who has been known to show up at the camp and harass young 
girls. In addition to this, many Batek people fear that gɔp will consider them 
disgusting for eating meat such as monitor lizards, not because it has come 
from the plantation but because it is haram (Arabic/Malay: forbidden by 
Islamic law), and because of their many past experiences of prejudice. This 
sentiment of suspicion and fear of ridicule has a long history, with its roots in 
19th-century slave raiding by Malays (Endicott 1983; Endicott 2016, 13–29), 
and it is further compounded by current attempts to force the Batek to 
convert to Islam or Christianity and to assimilate into Malaysian society 
(Dentan 1997 et al.), particularly in the area where we were at that time. 
Though a few Batek people have good relationships with Malays and other 
outsiders, harm at the hands of gɔp can be very real. On the day in 
question, when gɔp arrived, people feared being ridiculed and made to feel 
ashamed, at the same time as they were worried that they might get sick if 
the man was rude about their meat or that there might be a storm, since 
monitor lizards are a lawac animal. 
On hearing her sister’s call, Naʔ Srimjam hurriedly started hiding the 
meat away under banana leaves, covered the fire with a sarong, handed me 
the skewer with the liver telling me to hide it, grabbed her young baby, and 
sprinted off into the trees, out of sight. I followed her to where she crouched 
behind some tall ferns, weeping with uncontrollable laughter. 
This kind of laughter in response to situations in which gɔp are around 
is very common. Another gɔp, this time a Malay tour guide, would often 
cause real fear to Batek people when he would turn up drunk to their camps 
and expose himself to the women. But when he wasn’t around (and 
sometimes, covertly, even when he was around), people (especially the 
women) would laugh loudly at his awkward gait and mock him with offensive 
and lewd names. 
In a similar vein, people often also treat Gubar irreverently, even 
though he is the one who causes storms in response to lawac tabooed 
actions in the first place (Endicott 1979, 167; see also Lye 2002, 11; 2005, 
155). One afternoon, Naʔ ʔAliw had absentmindedly broken a lawac taboo 
and cooked noodles on the same fire as fish. That evening, Gubar was not 
happy. Rain was falling in sheets, his thunderous voice was rumbling, and 
the wind was howling, making the trees creak and moan ominously. We 
were roused from sleep, young children were strapped to their parents in 
case we had to run suddenly from a falling tree, and the men were stoking 
huge fires to try to prevent the rain (during a storm, Batek people build big 
fires to make the rain go away). People were obviously afraid, nervously 
scanning the tree line. 
Then, Krdoŋ cut her shin and mixed the blood with water in a jug, and 
one by one others went up so their shins could also be cut (or sometimes 
the mixture just wiped on their shin and then put back in the jug). Naʔ 
ʔAliw’s husband, ʔEy ʔAliw, took the jug from her and threw the mixture up 
over the roofs of the lean-tos, shouting at Gubar to stop being angry, 
pleading with him that they were “good” (btʔɛt) people. Naʔ ʔAliw joined 
him, and they shared throwing the mixture around, but every time there 
was a particularly loud clap of thunder, they would burst out laughing: “Oh, 
Gubar,” “Ha ha ha, he’s so loud,” “Aaah, Gubar, what is he doing?” Others in 
the camp laughed as well. 
Even though laughter itself can make Gubar angry, it was laughter at 
Gubar that drew him into the same ethical realm, thereby reducing the hold 
of the fear that he caused. Extending this idea, people even revel in mocking 
the taboos themselves. Naʔ Srimjam once mocked the prohibitions 
surrounding the cutting of pandanus leaves: cutting pandanus after the time 
the heat starts to go out of the day can make one go “mad,” with an 
uncontrollably shaking head. On one pandanus-cutting trip, she asked me 
the time, and when I told her it was already 2:30 p.m., she suddenly very 
realistically faked shaking her head around, with staring eyes, pretending to 
be mad, until, after I got over my initial worry and shock, we both burst out 
laughing, imagining what it would have been like had she really “gone mad.” 
When we got back to camp, she repeated this story again and again to the 
others over the next few days, and it was received with hoots of laughter 
every time. 
The ways Batek laugh at gɔp, at Gubar, and at the taboos themselves 
thus contradicts the idea that egalitarian societies such as the Batek’s are in 
fact “governed” by their “divinities,” with their “life and death powers” over 
the human population (Sahlins 2017, 92). Rather, in a manner more akin to 
Ceq Wong and Nayaka people (Bird-David 1999; Howell 2017, 144), Batek 
people socialize with Gubar—perhaps through paying attention to his 
sensory preferences by not laughing or committing other displeasing acts, or 
perhaps by laughing at him when his actions may threaten them. Though his 
actions may cause real fear and devastating consequences, he is not 
considered to be “governing” them. 
Similarly, laughing at the taboos ensures they do not become 
proscriptive or dogmatic. Like Gubar, they are something to be related 
with—perhaps through adherence to them, or perhaps through distancing 
mockery of them. Through their laughter practices, then, Batek people 
“actively prevent the emergence of religious and cosmological doctrine” 
(Kricheff and Lukas 2015, 140). 
Relating with through laughter can therefore be ambiguous. On the 
one hand, sharing in laughter—like sharing in material possessions or food—
can be seen as realizing a kind of “intrinsic good”: the pleasure of “mutual 
engagement” (Widlok 2016, 69; see also Bird-David 2005; Widlok 2004). 
When people laughed at Gubar during the storm, they emphasized the 
pleasure of laughing together. This shared loss of corporeal control creates 
pleasure, joy, and mutuality for the in-group, perhaps even more so when 
there is a shared understanding that this laughter is tabooed and wrong. On 
the other hand, laughter at can be diminishing, separating those laughing 
from those being laughed at, as is also the case among the Warlpiri of 
central Australia (Musharbash 2008, 275). 
When Batek people laugh at gɔp, they emphasize their ethical 
separation, not only by contrasting ways of laughing in ethical terms, but 
also by laughing at them or in situations in which gɔp may otherwise cause 
fear. This is also the case when people laugh at Gubar. Although on the one 
hand he may be related with through laughter (or through peoples’ attempts 
to not laugh, as he wishes), at the same time his separateness is maintained 
as people laugh at him. Both gɔp and Gubar are thus drawn into a shared 
ethical realm by the very fact of people’s attempts to distinguish them as 
separate, as is also the case of the Orokaiva of Papua New Guinea (Bashkow 
2006, 13–14). There is thus an ethical tension at the heart of how people 
negotiate the laughter taboos. While laughter creates togetherness, it can at 
the same time foreground separation and difference. 
Laughter is therefore messy. In practice, it can have many 
consequences and can set up ethical quandaries. With ethics, it is therefore 
not solely an individual’s actions and dispositions, repeated without 
conscious reflection, that create durable structures (Bourdieu 1993). 
Continually reenacting ethically significant everyday practices or acts is 
important for inculcating particular ethical orientations (Lambek 2010a, 7). 
If this were the limit, however, it would be “a relentlessly watertight 
explanation of a world in which it would be a miracle if anything were to ever 
change, one also from which cruelty, pride, and jealousy are quite as absent 
as love” (Laidlaw 2014, 9; see also Farnell 2000). Given that laughter can be 
spontaneous and often uncontrollable—and yet that ways of laughing are 
nevertheless fundamental to Batek people’s conceptualizations of how to be 
“good”—then ethical life itself cannot be understood as watertight. 
Ethical orientations will not be identical for everyone; they are not 
fixed, and yet they can be shared. As Naʔ Srimjam showed, when it comes 
to the ways they laugh, people can orient themselves toward a shared 
understanding of “the good,” tied in with their sense of “Batek-ness,” at the 
same time as they can act autonomously. What people define as “good,” 
how and why these ideals are shaped, and how people live up to them 
(Widlok 2004, 59), all contribute to the messiness of the ethical quandaries 
inherent in living an actual life (Keane 2016, 26; Mattingly 2014). 
[h1]“The one with no eyelashes”: When things “just happen” 
[ni]When people react to taboo laughter, they demonstrate the ethical 
tension at the heart of how they navigate their laughter taboos. For 
example, ʔEy Barəʔ, his relatives, and I would often revel in forbidden 
laughter. On one occasion, he sang a shaman’s song, inserting the phrase 
“the one with no eyelashes,” a humorous avoidance name for fish. His wife, 
his brother-in-law, and I all fell about laughing. “The one with no eyelashes,” 
he carried on, as we all wiped tears from our eyes. His wife, Naʔ Mtkɔt, told 
him to watch out, or he would go mad since the song he was mocking was a 
shaman’s song. He carried on regardless, and over the rest of the evening 
and the next few days, he kept chiming in with his rendition of the song at 
hilariously inopportune moments, causing us all to choke on our tea or burst 
out laughing while doing something else. As usual, protestations that we 
might go mad only made people stop joking for a few moments before 
chuckling again. Knowing we shouldn’t be laughing made everything funnier, 
even though people chided that laughing so much and so loudly made us 
risk being lawac. 
The next day, our breakfast was fish (or “the ones with no 
eyelashes”). A few hours later, I began to feel queasy, with cramping pains 
in my stomach. I told Naʔ Mtkɔt and ʔEy Barəʔ. Naʔ Mtkɔt was worried, but 
ʔEy Barəʔ just laughed—“Well, you shouldn’t have been laughing at my song 
about the fish, then! You were ridiculing it! That’s why you now have an 
upset stomach!” I protested that I had only laughed, but it was he who had 
been singing the song and laughing, as had everyone else who was present, 
so why was it only me who was now sick when he was fine?! He laughed and 
said, “It just is.” 
ʔEy Barəʔ is often described as a very “good” person by the people he 
is close to, and in the same breath they often laugh and say, “He is always 
teasing” and “He’s really naughty.” On this occasion, his laughter and 
teasing meant he was violating taboos on at least three counts. First, he was 
laughing loudly and a lot—and encouraging others to do so. This is lawac 
and risks causing a storm. Second, he was mocking a shaman’s song, which 
risks the laugher going mad. Third, he was laughing at something that we 
were going to eat, which caused my upset stomach. 
This illustrates that people’s ethical values and their ability to live up 
to them may not always be matched equally (Laidlaw 2014, 169). The 
demands of the taboos were that ʔEy Barəʔ not laugh, and yet this coexisted 
with the inherent pleasure of sharing in laughter. The reason the joke 
evoked laughter was grounded in shared knowledge of the taboos and what 
would have been the “right” behavior, yet part of what made it funny was 
that the taboos were being broken, that ʔEy Barəʔ was acting autonomously 
in relation to them. Each of the people present knew ʔEy Barəʔ very well, 
however, and so rather than this being ground for accusations of “madness” 
or “badness,” onlookers remarked that he was being taboo, but they also 
joined in the laughter. 
The ethical quandaries set up by laughter are thus shown again: in 
laughing when they know it is “wrong,” people assert autonomy in the face 
of what otherwise might become inflexible doctrine, just as when they mock 
the taboos themselves. At the same time, intimate ties between laughers 
are reinforced, grounded in the pleasure of laughing together. It was not 
required of ʔEy Barəʔ that he justify his actions, or reflect on what had 
happened, and there was no need to rationalize or reflect on why it was I 
who got sick and not the others, when it could have been any one of us—“it 
just was.” In moments when one laughs when one shouldn’t, the demands 
of ethics are in conflict. On the one hand, loud laughter is prohibited and 
risks danger, sickness, or offense to other people or Gubar. On the other 
hand, the pleasure and intrinsic good of laughing together is tempting and 
pleasurable, and indeed to not laugh at ʔEy Barəʔ’s joke may have caused a 
rupture in itself, marking him out as having done something “bad” or as an 
“outsider,” rather than as a relative who said something funny. 
It is in these moments of conflict, when people test out the kinds of 
laughter they can get away with, that people foster a shared understanding 
of the “good” and “right” ways to laugh. Because this may be different in 
different instances, a final answer can never entirely be reached. One can 
behave in the “right” (btʔɛt) way and enjoy the pleasure of laughing only 
moderately and at the right things, or one can succumb to temptation and 
revel in pleasurable, subversive, tabooed laughter, risking the dangerous 
consequences of madness, death, storms, or ostracism if one’s actions 
become too extreme. At the same time, it is understood that sometimes 
things just happen and that people are fallible or do things for unknowable 
reasons, and that this is the only explanation that can, or should, be offered. 
The idea that sometimes things “just are,” or that people do things “on 
their own,” somewhat contradicts the idea that being ethical inheres in self-
reflection (Laidlaw 2014, 93; see also Faubion 2001). In that understanding 
of ethics, when people are fallible, it is reflectiveness that is “absolutely 
necessary” in allowing subjects’ ethical beliefs to persist (and indeed to be 
strengthened), even when they fail to live up to their ideals (Laidlaw 2014, 
168–69; cf. Scheele 2015, 35). Batek people’s responses to moments when 
people get things wrong show that reflecting on issues is not the only way 
people can formulate ideas of right and wrong, or good and bad. 
This lack of evaluation or reflection doesn’t mean that people aren’t 
ethical or concerned with the “good” in their lives. In a manner akin to the 
“opacity of other minds” doctrine common among Melanesian groups 
(Robbins 2008; Schieffelin 2008; Stasch 2008), statements that sometimes 
things “just are” or that it is up to “them on their own,” reflect the idea that 
individual persons are autonomous—yet it is the closeness or togetherness 
of the people involved that allowed for this joke to take place at all, as is 
also the case for jokes among Western Apache people (Basso 1979, 68). A 
lack of ethical reflection may be what allows people to negotiate the fine 
balance of living autonomously yet together in the intimate familiar setting 
of a Batek camp. Such imaginings of what it means to be a person in 
relation to others are thus mutually implicated with people’s ethical 
orientations (Scheele 2015, 35). 
[h1]A “Batek” ethical orientation 
[ni]It is laughter’s contradictions that allow Batek people to orientate 
themselves toward a shared understanding of what is “good” without 
detracting from individuals’ autonomy. For them, ideas of right and wrong 
may shift in particular situations, sometimes being predefined as shared 
ethical imaginings and sometimes being taken into the hands of autonomous 
individuals while retaining their shape. 
The taboos on laughter mark out btʔɛt behaviors, some details of 
which may be slightly idiosyncratic, but which are, in the main, deeply 
shared. Because the laughter taboos are obvious, and grounded in and 
pervading all kinds of daily activities, they are an egalitarian way of 
inculcating these views, because they do not rely on any one authority figure 
to teach or enforce them. Thus, in their “correct” enactment, the laughter 
taboos are a form of ethical pedagogy. But because laughter is contagious 
and pleasurable, people don’t always adhere to the taboos. 
Furthermore, when faced with a potentially fearful being, situation, or 
proscriptive set of rules, it is laughter itself that can allow Batek people 
ethical autonomy. The fact that the taboos exist at all shows that the things 
one is not supposed to laugh at can be laughed at, and indeed, in some 
cases it may be impossible to avoid laughing since the situation or the thing 
is just so funny or tempting to say—as when ʔEy Barəʔ made up the song 
about the fish. Yet in the immediacy of the moment of interacting with kin 
and friends, people don’t always reflect on the ideal behavior as laid out by 
the taboos. With laughter, sometimes this would be impossible because it 
can sometimes erupt uncontrollably. Ideals must sometimes be set aside, 
whether this is with reflection or a simple “it just is.” Here, it is people’s very 
closeness that facilitates their autonomy in relation to the ideals laid out by 
the taboos. 
This reflects broader ethical orientations toward ways of relating that 
are commonly stated as “good” by Batek people. For example, positive 
judgments of btʔɛt are also specifically applied to the actions of people who 
don’t withhold food and belongings from others, who cultivate friendships, 
exhibit the right amount of shyness, don’t gossip unduly, don’t easily 
become jealous, and always invite others to come to the forest with them on 
food-collecting or “play” trips. 
Judgments of being jbec often center on ostentatious behavior, 
hoarding, violence, jealousy, or attempting to coerce others, though people 
may also not like someone for any other number of personal reasons. If 
taken to extreme levels, jbec behavior, especially violence, would warrant 
accusations of “madness.” They thus risk gossip, ridicule, or even varying 
levels of ostracism in extreme cases, especially if violence is involved. On 
more than one occasion, when I asked why someone had said another 
person was “bad,” it was whispered, “They are always hitting,” “They are 
always jealous,” “They don’t share their food,” or “They don’t want to make 
friends.” 
Ethical discourses thus often focus on whether a person is considered 
to cooperate with others fully and willingly, or whether they attempt to 
assert authority—perhaps using violence, withholding possessions from 
others, or attempting to coerce them through jealousy. Such actions would 
each deny others their autonomy. Through their discourses on btʔɛt and jbec 
behavior, people therefore negotiate relationships carefully, ensuring 
egalitarian relations such that no person can systematically assert 
dominance or hierarchy over others, or coerce them by withholding goods or 
using violence (Endicott and Endicott 2008; cf. Lewis 2008, 2014; for 
discussion of this among other egalitarian groups, see Woodburn 1982, 
2005). When it comes to ethics, it is not society that shapes the individual, 
nor is it solely individuals who control societies. Such a conception would risk 
imposing an implied “relation of domination,” one way or the other 
(Strathern 1990, 13; see also Helliwell 1996, 128–29), which would be at 
odds with Batek people’s broader egalitarian ideals. 
This necessitates that people have a flexible, ad hoc understanding of 
what might explicitly be framed in terms of what is “good,” “right,” and 
“beautiful” (btʔɛt), and “bad,” “wrong,” and “ugly” (jbec), which foregrounds 
the immediacy of experiences, in which people may act on either individual 
or collective concerns.10 Sometimes, things “just are”; people make 
mistakes and can’t help themselves. Learning to laugh thus helps people pin 
down the very fact that their ethical orientations can never be pinned down, 
that they are just that, orientations (on unresolvably contradictory moral 
messages among Bedouin people, see Abu-Lughod 2016, 252–55). In 
deciding whether to laugh or mock, to hold their laughter in even when 
something is funny, or to burst out laughing regardless of whether it’s 
appropriate, people shape their broader ethical orientations and their ability 
to work “separately together” (Bird-David 2017 129), and to cooperate 
autonomously (Endicott 2011; Endicott and Endicott 2008). 
Learning to understand that sometimes one shouldn’t laugh, but that 
one can’t control what is happening and nor can others, is as essential in 
shaping a “Batek” sense of the good as actually adhering to the taboos. 
Indeed, even when Batek people laugh when they aren’t supposed to, and 
they realize and articulate that what is happening is subversive (for 
example, through exclamations of “lawac!”), this is a contrast to the 
ignorant laughter of those gɔp who laugh without knowing or caring. 
Being unable to stop another from doing what they want to do thus 
becomes a part of the ethical orientation that comes to be seen as “Batek.” 
People’s succumbing to taboo laughter and their reactions to it exemplify 
this, and indeed shape the ethical skill of “Batekness” itself. It is this very 
flexibility that allows people to foster their ambiguous yet clearly demarked 
relationship with gɔp. In managing the conflicting demands and effects of 
laughter, people’s commitment to a “Batek” ethical orientation is 
strengthened. 
Not just through conscious reflection but also through the pleasure of 
laughter, anchored in the physical body, do Batek people learn not only how 
to be “right” but also how to be “wrong,” and to acknowledge the 
“wrongness” of others. Mistakes don’t need to be justified or reflected on 
every time, but this doesn’t mean that people don’t consider themselves 
ethical. Sometimes, things “just are.” It is thus the “problematic elements” 
of a culture that keep it “active, alive in the awareness of its carriers and 
flexible, responsive to change” (Briggs 1998, 209). Batek people may also 
decide to discuss and reflect upon ethical matters, and do so with great 
seriousness, but being ethical can also arise from acknowledging that 
sometimes in problematic moments, choosing a lack of reflection can itself 
be an ethical act. 
Taking seriously the moments when people get things wrong therefore 
shows that to understand ethics in any context, one should not start from 
either the view that ethics comprise obligations set out by broader cultural 
systems or from the view that they are defined by autonomous individuals. 
Rather, it may be that they are formed by finding an ad hoc balance 
between the two. Attention to the moments when people get things wrong 
can indicate how such a balance may occur; as in any ethical orientation, 
there may be constant shifts among acting in what is predefined as “right,” 
reflecting on this, or, unaccountably, and uncontrollably, being “wrong.” The 
ways people attempt “to create the good in their lives” (Robbins 2013, 457) 
are thus mutually implicated with broader ideas of person and society. 
Laughter is an ambiguous and multifaceted phenomenon that is 
uncontrollable and contagious. Given laughter’s potential as a site for getting 
things wrong, the ways people laugh might, in other contexts too, reflect not 
only what people think of as right and wrong (what or who do they laugh 
at), but also how they formulate these ideas in relation to concepts of what 
it means to be a person in relation to others. 
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1. Pseudonyms are used throughout this article. 
2. The orthography I use is based on the International Phonetic 
Alphabet, but it adheres to the orthographic standards commonly used in 
describing Aslian languages (Kruspe, Burenthult, and Wnuk 2015). 
Translations of Batek terms are my own. 
3. I conducted 18 months of fieldwork. This took place from February 
2014 to July 2015, with two additional follow-up visits of four to six weeks 
each in subsequent years. The field site was in and close to Taman Negara in 
Pahang. I conducted the fieldwork in Batek. 
4. The Batek people referred to here speak Batek Deq (abbreviated to 
Batek in this article) (Kruspe, Burenhult, and Wnuk 2015). 
5. As is also the case for the presence of “whitemen” among the 
Orokaiva of Papua New Guinea (Bashkow 2006). 
6. Similar “ambiguity” is important in Batek cultural resilience (Lye 
2013, 420), and it also applies to people’s relationship with the forest itself 
(Lye 2005, 50). 
7. See Kricheff and Lukas 2015 for discussion of the relationship 
between practice, identity, and egalitarianism among the Maniq, another 
Northern Aslian–speaking group. 
8. See also Keane 2016, 18–19; Laidlaw 2014, 110–19; Lambek 
2010b, 42. 
9. As is the case for Batek environmental knowledge more broadly 
(Lye 2003; 2005, 161). 
10. Similarly, among the Mbendjele, another egalitarian hunter-
gatherer group, “flux” is essential in the “process of continual renegotiation” 
that is egalitarianism (Finnegan 2017, 134). 
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